A transcendent moral source, the moral argument, as in William Lane Craig

Sources

• William Lane Craig, “The Moral Argument,” Reasonable Faith. (opens in a new tab)

  William Lane Craig, “The Moral Argument,” Reasonable Faith.

• “Craig on God and Morality,” a critical evaluation, PhilArchive. (opens in a new tab)

  “Craig on God and Morality,” a critical evaluation, PhilArchive.

• William Lane Craig, “The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality,” Foundations 5 (1997) (opens in a new tab)

  Foundations 5 (1997): 9-12, the essay the evidence text names

Objections & responses

The Euthyphro dilemma: either God commands things because they are good, so goodness is independent of him, or things are good because he commands them, so morality is arbitrary. Either way God doesn’t ground morality.

This is the classic objection, and every philosophy student will raise it. The standard theistic reply is that the dilemma is a false one: goodness is neither above God nor arbitrary but is God’s own nature, so his commands express what he is rather than what he happens to decide. Whether that reply works is debated (critics ask what makes God’s nature good), but it is the reply, and it has a long pedigree from Augustine to Robert Adams. The argument here points to a transcendent source, not automatically to the Christian God, and it leaves room for exactly this debate.

Craig’s second premise is defended by intuition and his first by the failure of alternatives. Isn’t that an argument from ignorance: “I can’t think how else morality could be grounded, therefore God”?

The argument is an inference to the best explanation, not an argument from ignorance; the difference is whether the alternatives have been examined and found wanting on their merits, which is what the previous three exhibits attempt. The fair criticism is that a fourth alternative is missing here: non-theistic moral realism (Wielenberg, Enoch, Parfit), on which moral facts are basic and need no grounding at all. That is the strongest rival, and it is treated in the Atheism case. The argument holds only to the degree that all four alternatives fall short, and you should weigh that fourth one yourself.

The claim assumes objective moral duties are real, but the earlier evidence only showed that people act as if they are. Acting as if something is real isn’t evidence that it is.

The conditional wording (if objective moral duties are real) is deliberate; moral realism is not claimed as proven here. What is offered is that nearly everyone, including most moral philosophers, believes some things are really wrong, and that the person who denies it has to explain away that near-universal conviction. The Atheism case gives the survey data on philosophers’ views. Arguing from a premise most readers already accept is a legitimate way to argue, as long as the premise is stated, and here it is.

Appears under 1 claim in this case

• If objective moral duties are real, the best explanation is a moral source beyond human beings rather than personal taste, cultural agreement, or evolution.