W.K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” the strongest objection to Plantinga’s Warrant

Sources

• W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief” (full text) (opens in a new tab)

  W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief” (1877)

Objections & responses

The “other minds” and “the world didn’t begin five minutes ago” examples aren’t analogous to God. Those beliefs are universal, involuntary, and their denial is self-defeating in practice. Belief in God is none of those things.

This is the strongest reply to the parity argument. Plantinga’s response is that belief in God is close to universal across cultures (the sensus divinitatis point) and is often involuntary for those who have it; its denial is not self-defeating, granted. So the analogy is partial. The narrower point survives: Clifford’s rule, taken strictly, would forbid many beliefs everyone holds, so it cannot be the standard, and a weaker standard has to say why belief in God specifically fails it. That is an argument about evidence, not about the ethics of belief, and it is welcome.

Clifford’s rule isn’t self-refuting. There is evidence for it, namely the harms that come from believing on insufficient evidence, which his shipowner parable illustrates.

Fair; Clifford does give a consequentialist argument for his rule. The precise point is that the rule is not believed on the basis of the kind of evidence the rule itself demands, since the argument from harm is a moral argument, not empirical proof that the rule is true. That still shows the rule needs non-scientific support to stand, which is the point. A moral argument for an epistemic rule is a perfectly good thing to have; it just cannot be the only kind of reason allowed.

Appears under 1 claim in this case

• Alvin Plantinga argues that belief in God can be “warranted” and rationally held without a supporting argument, which means the charge that such belief is irrational cannot be settled without first asking whether it is true.